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Reform of financial institutions is a subject that simmers annually
on many political back burners but rarely reaches the boiling point.
Within one week during the month of August last summer, however,
the Administration and Congress heated up the issue with detailed
reports proposing major institutional reforms. This change in tem-
perature did not go unnoticed: Spokesmen for the banking com-
munity acknowledged that this week could be "one of the most im-
portant in the recent history of the Nation's financial structure."'
While this does not necessarily mean that changes will occur 2 enough
is now brewing to make appropriate a critical evaluation of the issues
raised by these proposals.
The Department of the Treasury prepared the Administration re-
port,3 which contained legislative proposals derived from an earlier
report that the Hunt Commission 4 had submitted to the Administra-
tion. Congressional reaction came in the form of a staff report by the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, chaired by Congressman
Wright PatmanG In October 1978 the Administration submitted to
the House and Senate comprehensive legislation embodying its earlier
proposals entitled "The Financial Institutions Act of 1973."6 In No-
t Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1. BANKING, Sept. 1973, at 63.
2. The political handicappers vary in their estimates of the likelihood of new
legislation embodying these reforms, but the amount of industry discussion suggests
that it is at least an open question. See, e.g., Am. Banker, Jan. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 2;
Bus. WEEK, Nov. 3, 1973, at 83-84; BANKERS MONTHLY, Oct. 1973, at 20-28, 38-39.
3. Dep't of the Treasury, Recommendations for Change in the U.S. Financial Sys-
tem, Sept. 24, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Treasury Recommendations].
4. The Hunt Commission (named after its Chairman, retired Crown Zellerbach execu-
tive Reed 0. Hunt) reported to the President on December 22, 1972. U.S. PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE REGULATION, REPORT iii (1972) [hereinafter cited
as HUNT CoMM'N REPORT].
5. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: REFORM AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Comm. Print 1973) [here-
inafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. Occasionally the congressional proposals outlined in
the STAFF REPORT will be designated herein as the "Patman proposals" to distinguish
them from the "Administration proposals."
6. S.2591, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 10990, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (sub-
titled "A Bill to improve the efficiency and flexibility of the financial system of the
United States in order to promote sound economic growth, including the provision
of adequate funds for housing").
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vember the Senate began hearings on this billy By then, the House
Committee on Banking and Currency had already completed hear-
ings8 on the proposals raised by its Staff Report. Specific legislation
embodying the House proposals is being developed this spring and
may be forthcoming by the opening of the 94th Congress.
This article will examine the professed goals of reform and evaluate
the extent to which they are met by various legislative proposals. Of
overriding importance to these legislative schemes is improvement
of the flow of funds into the home mortgage market. 9 The first section
of this article will deal with that issue. The second section will exam-
ine bank trust departments and their impact upon the ability of finan-
cial institutions to compete effectively. While the Administration's
proposals do not address this issue, this article will suggest that it is
at the core of an overall approach to reform. The third section of this
article will raise another issue that has gone unnoticed and is ignored
by the Administration's proposals-the problem of institutional reform
of the banking agencies themselves. An analysis of these three issues
should provide a unified view of the major needs of financial insti-
tution reform.'0
I. Banking Competition and the Home Mortgage Market
The Administration's legislative proposals are based upon the free
market concepts articulated in the Hunt Commission Report and
Treasury Recommendations." The essential idea is that, by removing
interest rate and investment constraints on competition between com-
mercial banks and thrift institutions, 12 the federal government can
7. Hearings on Financial Structure and Regulation Before the Subcomm. on Fi-
nancial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
8. Hearings on The Credit Crunch and Reform of Financial Institutions Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pts. I & II (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Credit Crunch Hearings].
9. See President Nixon's Message to Congress, Aug. 2, 1973, reprinted in Treasury
Recommendations, supra note 3, at 1-3. The first sentence of that Message states,
"Our country depends on a strong, efficient and flexible financial system to promote
sound economic growth, including the provision of adequate funds for housing."
Compare note 6 supra. See Robinson, The Hunt Commission Report: The Search
for Politically Feasible Solutions to the Problem of Financial Structure, 27 J. FIN.
965, 971 (1972).
10. In researching this article I have conferred with, and read statements by, rep-
resentatives of major interest groups, including the regulatory bodies themselves. I
believe that whatever biases appear here (and undoubtedly some do) predate my
current research.
11. See HUNT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 17; Treasury Recommendations,
supra note 3, at 10.
12. The term "bank" usually refers to commercial banks that receive demand
deposits subject to check, make business, consumer, and personal loans, and provide
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promote the flow of new loanable funds to those institutions. To en-
courage the investment of these new funds in home mortgages, the
Administration bill would give financial institutions a tax credit
measured by the percentage of mortgage loans to total loans.13 The
Patman proposals, as currently described in the Staff Report, 4 suggest
instead a direct constraint upon the market by requiring minimum
investments in home mortgage loans.' 5 Both approaches, however,
proceed from the premise that the present regulatory system is at
fault. That system is therefore an appropriate place to begin evaluat-
ing the reform proposals.
A. The Present Approaches to the Home Mortgage Problem
Everyone realizes that mortgage money is tight today. It is either
unavailable altogether or priced at an interest rate' 6 that makes it
functionally unavailable to a vast portion of the population.' 7 The
effect on home building is inexorable; housing starts have dropped
dramatically.' 8 This situation seriously compromises the longstanding
national policy "to provide a decent home and suitable living environ-
ment for every American family."'19 The framers of the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 196820 predicted that, to meet announced
goals, the housing industry would have to produce an average of 2.6
fiduciary services. Savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks are usually
known as "thrift institutions." I will apply herein no absolute rule to limit the term
bank or banking to the former context unless such steps are necessary to avoid con-
fusion. The reader should remember, however, that the federal government does
not charter mutual savings banks.
13. S.2591, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 707 (1973). See Nixon-Hunt Proposals-Pro and
Con, BANKERS MONTHLY, Oct. 1973, at 20 (statement of William E. Simon). Some Hunt
Commission members who preferred direct subsidies rejected this tax credit proposal.
See HuNT COMN'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 134 (dissent of W. Morton & E. Malone).
14. STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 37-53.
15. Id. at 38.
16. Interest rates on mortgage loans are running in excess of nine percent, and
additional payments known as "points" (in effect prepaid interest due in a lump
sum at closing) are frequently part of the loan package. See generally Treasury
Recommendations, supra note 3, at 2.
17. The staff of the House Committee on Banking and Currency has estimated,
for example, that at an effective interest rate of nine percent (on a $20,000, 30-year
mortgage), 60 percent of the families in the United States (those with annual in-
comes of less than $11,570) are priced out of the housing market. See STAFF REPORT,
supra note 5, at 34-35. This analysis assumes that families will allocate about 25
percent of their total income for housing.
18. See, e.g., HUD News, Feb. 6, 1974 (November, 1973, commitments for long-term
residential mortgage loans were off by almost half compared to November, 1972);
HUD Newsletter, Oct. 29, 1973 (housing starts for September, 1973, off 15 percent
from August, 1973). But see Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1974, at 1, col. 4 (starts in February,
1974, rose 22 percent over prior month to a projected annual rate of I.8 million
units; this total is still below 1973 figures).
19. Housing Act of 1949,42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
20. Id. § 1441(a).
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million new and rehabilitated units of housing annually over a ten-
year period.21 Actual production in the four years since enactment
has left a housing production "shortfall" of 3.2 million units.2 2 To
some extent, at least, the success of bank regulatory policy, as well as
related administrative programs, may be measured by the ability to
meet this fundamental social goal.
23
The historic regulatory response to the problem of providing funds
for housing and mortgage markets has involved direct and indirect
intervention. Federal repayment guarantees, provided by the Veterans'
Administration (VA) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA),
encourage financial institutions to make higher risk home mortgage
loans;2 4 and frequently the government itself directly enters the mar-
ket and buys up mortgages from private institutions through the Fed-
eral and Government National Mortgage Associations5 The govern-
ment also seeks to foster the flow of deposits into institutions that
make most of the home mortgage loans (the savings and loan associa-
tions and mutual savings banks) 26 by establishing a deposit interest
rate ceiling that favors those institutions. The federal banking agen-
cies are empowered to set these ceilings, 27 and have done so in such
a manner as to shelter thrift institutions from deposit competition
with commercial banks.28 In the early 1960's a favorable ceiling on
21. That figure includes annually 600,000 new and rehabilitated units allocated
to low and moderate income families. STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 26.
22. Id. Of the overall shortfall, 1.1 million is in housing allocated to low and
middle income families. These figures do not reflect mobile home production be-
cause mobile homes do not meet federally established space and construction standards.
Id. One might well question, however, whether the 1968 housing goals are still ap-
propriate in light of the changed character of population growth and the impact
of environmental and energy considerations.
23. Another announced social goal, which will not be treated independently here,
is to encourage investment in state and local bonds. See STAFF REPORT, supra note
5, at 1-48. And certainly one may suggest other goals of banking regulation, such
as setting monetary policy, that must be evaluated separately.
24. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1802-06, 1810-17 (1970); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1709-15 (1970).
25. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-23 (1970). As of 1971, federal agencies held 8.7 percent
of the loans financing one- to four-family residences. STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 37,
quoting THE SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BOOK OF 1972.
26. As of 1971, those institutions held 46.6 percent and 12.6 percent, respectively,
of the outstanding loans financing one- to four-family residences. STAFF REPORT, supra
note 5, at 37. From the asset side, as of the end of 1971, savings and loans and
mutual savings banks held 69.3 percent and 43.1 percent, respectively, of their assets
in the form of home mortgages. By comparison commercial banks held 8.5 percent
of their assets in home mortgages. Id. at 86 (Table 17).
27. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board sets rates for savings and loan associa-
tions. 12 U.S.C. § 1425 (1970). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system
limits the amount of interest that may be paid on time and savings deposits by
members of the Federal Reserve system. Id. § 3716; 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1973). The FDIC
sets rate ceilings for state nonmember banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (1970). Since each of
the three banking agencies consults the others prior to issuing a regulation, there
is normally no difference among the rate ceilings. This coordination of function will
be assumed throughout this article when rate ceilings are discussed.
28. See 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1973) (Regulation Q).
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time deposits relative to market rates encouraged retention of funds
in the favored institutions, and funds for mortgage loans were con-
sequently plentiful.29 But in years of tight money-1966, 1969, and
1974-the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) has pursued a restrictive
monetary policy as a means of controlling inflation.30 The result has
been money market interest rates significantly higher than the interest
ceiling which depository institutions (either thrifts or commercial
banks) were permitted to offer. The power to limit rates under Regu-
lation Q consequently became ineffective as a means of ensuring a
deposit flow to thrift institutions,31 and in fact had a perverse effect
on such deposit flows. When money market rates also exceeded what
could permissibly have been paid by depository institutions, there
was a flight of funds from savings accounts into higher yielding money
market instruments (such as Treasury Bills and market securities),
a phenomenon analysts labeled "disintermediation."3 2 While all finan-
cial institutions are disabled by interest ceilings which act to prevent
intermarket competition for funds, thrift institutions face a more
serious liquidity crisis than commercial banks because of their heavy
investment in long-term mortgage loans and because of statutory pro-
hibitions on lending.33 This crisis produces a dramatic decline in net
loanable funds by thrifts and, since mortgages are their main invest-
ment, a serious constriction on the amount of home mortgage money
available.3 4 Disintermediation can seemingly occur overnight, when-
ever the FRB tightens monetary policy. When the FRB tightened
monetary policy in 1966, for example, net loanable funds of savings
and loan associations declined sharply by 30 percent from the prior
year.
3 G
To some extent the federal banking agencies have attempted to
29. See generally S. Cohan, The Regulation of Interest Rate Ceilings, FDIC Working
Paper 73-10 (1973).
T0. See Knight, Comments on the Hunt Commission Report, FRB K.C. MONTHLY
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 3-4.
31. Id. See also Robinson, supra note 9, at 770.
32. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 303-04 (8th
ed. 1970).
33. Thrifts are said to be in the posture of "borrowing short and lending long"
because of regulatory constraints that limit investments principally to real estate loans.
In fact over 85 percent of all assets of thrifts are invested in home mortgage loans.
Knight, supra note 30, at 5. The remainder of investments for federal savings and
loan associations are in home modernization and repair, mobile home, educational,
and saving account loans, all of which may also be unattractive in a tight money
situation. Id. at 6.
34. Tight money policy also serves to extend the length of lower interest mortgage
loan commitments, which further restricts the amount of loanable funds available to
thrifts. Since 1966, for instance, the average life of a mortgage loan has increased
from six to eight years to about 14 years. Id. at 6 nA.
35. The decline was from $24.5 billion in 1965 to $17.4 billion in 1966. Id. at 6.
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overcome this cyclical availability of mortgage loans by raising in-
terest rate ceilings (especially on long-term deposits) under Regula-
tion Q.36 This approach has not insured a steady flow of funds into
the home mortgage market.37 Reforms to free financial institutions
from regulatory constraints that supposedly prevent them from react-
ing effectively to conditions in the general money market have there-
fore been suggested.
B. A Critique of Proposed Reforms
The proposed Financial Institutions Act and the reports that sup-
port it conclude that the liquidity ills currently confronting thrift
institutions (and the home mortgage market they serve) can best be
overcome by massive de-regulation designed to revive competitive
forces in the market place. The Administration's de-regulation pro-
posal consists of several connected steps. 38 One is a general phaseout
of interest ceilings. The ceilings contained in Regulation Q are to
be phased out over a five-and-one-half-year transition period and the
FHA and VA ceilings are to be removed immediately. 39 However,
the Hunt Commission's recommended imposition of a variable interest
rate on mortgages was not included in the Act.40
Coupled with the phaseout of ceilings are several changes designed
to make thrift institutions and credit unions in many respects like
36. One way the banks were able to fight this outflow of funds was by the use
of long-term four-year certificates of deposit which provide for higher interest rates.
The FRB approved so-called "wildcard certificates" in $1,000 denominations which
were unrestricted as to the rate that could be paid. See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra
note 8, at 59, 62-63 (statement of Savings & Loan League Chairman, Legis. Comm.,
Tom B. Scott, Jr.). But the thrift institutions recently prevailed upon Congress to
require banking agencies to establish an interest rate ceiling on those certificates.
Act of Oct. 15, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-123, 87 Stat. 449. The current ceilings are
7 percent for commercial banks and 72 percent for thrifts. There is no ceiling
on certificates over $100,000. FED. REs. BULL., Mar. 1974, at A10.
37. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 65-80.
38. The President has urged that these steps be enacted as a package in order to
achieve the desired results. Treasury Recommendations, supra note 3, at 3. See
BANKING, supra note I.
39. S.2591, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 101-06 (1973) (Title I). This title eliminates
the interest rate ceiling and the differential in maximum allowable interest rates
between thrifts and commercial banks in four steps over a transition period designed
to minimize market disruption. The title also allows for payment of interest on certain
types of demand deposit accounts known as negotiable order of withdrawal (N.O.W.)
accounts. The bill does not permit, however, the long forbidden payment of interest
on simple demand deposits or checking accounts. See HUNT COeMW'N REPORT, supra
note 4, at 27; Treasury Recommendations, supra note 3, at 6. See generally P.
SAMUELSON, supra note 32, at 302-03. N.O.W. accounts are currently ]ermitted in two
states-Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See Consumers Say. Bank v. Commissioner
of Banks, 282 N.E.2d 416 (Mass. 1972). In addition, several states will permit checking
accounts to bear interest soon. See Allen, The Hunt Commission Report, Bus. LAw.,
Jan. 1974, at 499, 511.
40. See Treasury Recommendations, supra note 3, at 32.
1354
Vol. 83: 1349, 1974
Perspectives on Reform of Financial Institutions
commercial banks. 41 Thrifts may offer third party payment services
(such as checking accounts and credit cards) and consumer and edu-
cation loans. The restrictions on investment in real estate loans are
lifted.42 In return for these expanded competitive powers, thrifts are
deprived of tax credits for reserves of mortgages, which are currently
denied commercial banks, in an attempt to achieve "tax neutrality"
for all financial institutions.43 The proposed tax credit is qual to
a percentage of the interest earned in residential mortgage holdings,
and it is available equally to all financial institutions.44
The Patman proposals, like those of the Administration, are based
upon the assumption that expansion of the credit base to include
all financial institutions is a desirable first step to infuse funds into
the home mortgage market. They, however, do not rely on the market
alone to satisfy the goals of national policy. Once all financial insti-
tutions are made functionally similar, they will be required to invest
a portion of their assets (measured by their asset growth rate for the
previous year)45 in the home mortgage market. To insure this level
of contribution, any shortfall in required mortgage investments would
translate into a mandatory deposit of the shortfall amount in the
federal reserve bank for direct mortgage investment by that institu-
tion. 40 The goal of this requirement is to give financial institutions
every incentive to involve themselves directly in the home mortgage
market at least to the extent of their annual asset growth.
The Patman proposals, unlike those of the Administration, do not
abolish interest rate ceilings. They retain the FHA and VA ceilings
41. S.2591, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 201-02 (1973) (Title II).
42. Thrifts are, however, still prohibited from making business loans, which are
by far the largest category of commercial bank loans. See note 78 & pp. 1360-61 infra.
43. S.2591, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 701-09 (1973) (Title VII). See Senate Hearings,
supra note 7, at 33 (statement of William E. Simon); Treasury Recommendations,
supra note 3, at 6-7.
44. The tax credit is designed to induce investment in residential mortgages by
setting various incentive levels. Thus, for institutions with 70 percent of their assets
in mortgage loans, a credit equal to 3.5 percent of mortgage income is allowed. For
each percent below 70 percent, the credit is reduced by one-thirtieth. S.2591, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., § 707 (1973). The Administration estimates that this provision will
cost the Treasury $180 million more (or $712 million) than the current tax benefit
provisions for thrift institutions. Based on current mortgage holdings, thrifts would
receive most of the new tax credit (commercial banks hold an average of about 8
percent of their assets in residential mortgages). See Senate Hearings, supra note 7,
at 34-35 (statement of William E. Simon). This tax credit has been criticized as in-
adequate to encourage mortgage investment. See Bus. WEEK, Nov. 3, 1973, at 83.
But see Kane, Taxation of Savings & Loans and Commercial Banks, FED. HoME LOAN
BANK BD. J., July 1973, at 10.
45. STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 3, 38. This limitation is designed to avoid
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in order to prevent lenders from pricing such mortgage loans well
above the conventional rate and thereby restrict the ability of some
lower income families to purchase homes.47 For similar reasons the
Patman proposals reject the variable interest rate.4
8
These two proposals approach the question of banking reform from
two different directions. The Administration, despite some statements
to the c6ntrary, seems more concerned with the efficiencies that will
supposedly arise as a result of the operation of the competitive mar-
ket.49 The Patman proposals, however, while not disavowing effi-
ciency (in the form of more bank and thrift competition), are more
concerned with questions of equity and redistribution. These ap-
proaches, of course, represent the classic tension in regulatory decision-
making. Once identified, this tension helps to explain the reaction
of many who will be most directly affected by the legislation.
1. Industry Reaction
As expected, industry and regulators have widely divergent views
on the proposed reforms. The thrift institutions, which are to gain
many of the powers of commercial banks under both proposals, have
indicated that the loss of favored treatment (interest ceilings and tax
advantages) is too high a price to pay for equality.50 Thrift spokesmen
have suggested a compromise which would grant them the benefits
of the competitive proposals (new investment and third party pay-
ment powers) but retain the existing protections (such as the tax-free
bad debt reserve for mortgage loans and the interest rate differen-
tials).51 At the heart of the objections to the Administration's pro-
posals is the fear that open competition by thrifts or small banks with
large commercial banks would lead to market dominance by those
larger institutions.52
47. Id. at 30.
48. The concern here is that home owners are less able than lenders to absorb
the increased costs of higher interest rates during tight money periods. Id. at 30-31.
49. Deputy Treasury Secretary Simon, speaking for the Administration, outlined
six goals of the President's recommendations. The first was "to create a more effi-
cient financial system," the second was "to have our financial system serve all the
needs of the community," and the fifth was to provide "a more stable and constant
flow of funds into housing .... ." Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 23.
50. See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 23-57 (statement of Raleigh W.
Greene, President, Nat'l League of Insured Say. Ass'ns).
51. See, e.g., statement of William L. Reynolds, Executive Director, Nat'l League
of Insured Say. Ass'ns, quoted in BANKERS MONTHLY, Oct. 1973, at 27-28.
52. See, e.g., statement of Howard Bell, Executive Director, Independent Bankers
Ass'n, quoted in BANKERS MONTHLY, Oct. 1973, at 22-23. Mr. Bell argued:
One effect of this proposal would be greater banking concentration. The
large financial institutions, those with the greatest capacity to establish branches,
would grow larger. The small would grow smaller or become branches of the
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Perhaps not surprisingly, large commercial banks have generally
supported open competition among financial institutions a The
American Bankers Association (ABA) has called the Administration's
proposals "the most important potential banking legislation in the
last 40 years."0 4 As of this date, the ABA has been lobbying for the
enactment of the Financial Institutions Act of 1973, although objec-
tions of its smaller bank members have led the ABA to oppose re-
moval of Regulation Q interest rate ceilings. 5
The federal agencies which share jurisdiction over financial insti-
tutions (the FRB, Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)) have also generally favored the
Administration's proposals. The Comptroller has enthusiastically en-
dorsed the bill and concluded that if adopted in full it would open
"an era of challenge and opportunity for all."' 6 FRB Chairman Arthur
Burns favors proposals to allow thrift institutions to compete in other
lending markets, such as the market for consumer loans, so as to avoid
the asymmetry and disintermediation caused by lending long and
borrowing short.57 Burns has also encouraged use of the variable
interest rate. 8 The FDIC favors the two basic objectives of reform
proposed by the Administration (and concurred in by the Patman
proposals): removal of deposit rate ceilings, and expansion of asset
and deposit powers of thrifts. 9
Other federal agencies without direct supervisory responsibility
over financial institutions have also commented on the proposed
reforms. The Securities and Exchange Commission stressed the com-
petitive threat to the marketplace posed by the huge financial re-
larger. Competition, the public's one real protection in our economy, would be
eroded or destroyed. So would consumer and small business options because
loan sources, especially those available to such groups, would be fewer, with the
higher rates and less favorable terms such a market brings. In addition, resources
would be drained from many areas, particularly rural districts-where country
banks invest locally, large banks tend to invest in national or international
market places to secure the highest terms.
53. See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 769-78 (statement of Am. Bankers
Ass'n President Eugene H. Adams).
54. Statement of Eugene H. Adams, Chairman, Governing Council, Am. Bankers Ass'n,
quoted in BANKERS MONTHLY, Oct. 1973, at 22. See Am. Bankers Ass'n, Summary and
Interpretive Analysis of the [Hunt Commission] Report, Mar. 1972.
55. See Bus. WEEK, Nov. 3, 1973, at 83. It has been suggested that one of the
concerns of small banks is that removal of interest rate ceilings will reduce their
profits since they operate in sheltered market areas where deposit flows are un-
affected by interest rate competition. See S. Cohan, supra note 29.
56. Statement of James E. Smith, quoted in BANKERS MONTHLY, Oct. 1973, at 28.
See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 384-86 (statement of the Comptroller
of the Currency, James E. Smith).
57. See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 313-22.
58. Id. at 321.
59. See id. at 392 (statement of FDIC Chairman Frank Wille).
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sources of commercial banks;6 0 but the Justice Department has gen-
erally discounted that danger by suggesting that remedies under the
antitrust laws are adequate to deal with the problem of concentra-
tion.61 The New York Superintendent of Banks pointed out that,
even without new legislation, recent action has drastically reduced
the protection that Regulation Q provides thrift institutions.6 2 Finally,
public interest groups have tended to doubt the likelihood that the
Administration's proposals are adequate to ensure the public ob-
jective of providing additional funds for the home mortgage market.6 3
2. A Critical Assessment
Most agree that the present scheme of regulation is less than op-
timal, since it was inspired by the insolvency fears of the Depression
era and has not since been systematically reexamined. 4 Today the
focus on bank solvency as the rationale for regulation is less relevant
than other goals, such as the need to maximize efficient allocation
of available funds for priority purposes. The Administration and
Patman proposals, therefore, both view the current regulation as
excessive and counterproductive. The proposals also profess agree-
ment on the importance of setting aside additional funds for housing;
but they disagree substantially on methods of implementing that goal.
If the Administration is correct that free competition (with mod-
erate tax incentives) will achieve stated home mortgage market goals,
imposition of the mandatory controls contained in the Patman pro-
posals is unnecessary and inadvisable. But for two basic reasons the
evidence in support of the free market solution must be closely
assessed before regulatory policy is revised. First, if the competitive
model does prove inadequate to achieve desired goals, new regulatory
issues will have to be confronted, including of course the politically
sensitive issue of direct housing subsidies. 65 Second, resort to competi-
60. The SEC is concerned about the impact of commercial bank entry (either di-
rectly or through deposit rate competition) into the securities markets. Id. at 520-26
(statement of SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr.).
61. Id. at 526-38 (statement of Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy Planning, Anti-
trust Div., Dep't of Justice).
62. Harry W. Albright, Jr., Address to Savings Banks Ass'n of New York State,
Nov. 12, 1973, at 3-6 [hereinafter Albright Address]. Compare Credit Crunch Hearings,
supra note 8, at 463 (statement of Prof. Fairfax Leary).
63. See, e.g., Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 458-95 (statement of
Ralph Nader).
64. See, e.g., id. at 473 (statement of Ralph Nader); Treasury Recommendations,
supra note 3, at 1.
65. The stigma that our society places upon direct payments, e.g., welfare, should
not be ignored. In regulatory matters, there is a tradition of full cost pricing that
encourages the (direct) beneficiaries to bear the burden. Variations from this regulatory
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tion in the banking industry may have other deleterious social effects
if the market structure of that industry demonstrates the presence of
significant economies of scale. In the presence of scale economies, the
competitive market might soon be supplanted by a concentrated one,
which would, in turn, present regulatory problems of perhaps a dif-
ferent nature.
As to the first issue,66 the evidence in favor of competition as a
solution to mortgage money problems is thin indeed. There is an
inevitable conflict between competition among lenders and subsidiza-
tion (of home mortgages) by lenders in banking. One contemplates
market freedom, the other market control. But the Administration's
proposals proceed on the assumption that banking competition will
lead to asset diversification which will allow thrift institutions to com-
pete for loanable mortgage funds in tight money periods.0 7 Thrifts
structured like commercial banks, however, may behave like commer-
cial banks, and available data tend to show that the diversified lenders
(i.e., commercial banks) have, except for the most recent periods, con-
tributed most to the instability of home mortgage lending during
tight money periods.0 8 If the past is any guide, permitting diversifica-
tion of the asset portfolios of thrift institutions will not improve the
flow of funds into the home mortgage market.0 9
Moreover, the Administration's own data on this point are not con-
vincing. Its only empirical evidence comes from a study commissioned
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development which simu-
lated the impact of the Hunt Commission recommendations on the
economy of the 1960's.70 The study concluded, somewhat equivocally,
that the amount of mortgage money would increase or decrease only
slightly.7
1
The Administration's proposals rely heavily upon a tax credit to
offset the loss of tax advantages to the thrifts. Currently, thrifts enjoy
practice may be defended precisely because they achieve certain social goals through
internal subsidization that might not be possible by direct legislative intervention.
Compare Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. MGT. Sct. 22 (1971).
66. The market concentration issue is discussed at pp. 1361-66 infra.
67. See HUNT COMm'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 78-79.
68. The FDIC has heavily researched this question. See R. Boorman & M. Peterson,
An Evaluation of the Recommendations of the Hunt Commission Related to Housing
Expenditures and the Mortgage Market, FDIC Working Paper 72-7, at 30 (1972);
Boorman & Peterson, The Hunt Commission and the Mortgage Market: An Appraisal,
3 J. BANK RESEARCH 155, 164 (1972); Boorman & Peterson, The Instability of Savings
Flows and Mortgage Lending by Financial Intermediaries, 40 S. EcoN. J. 297 (1973).
69. Id.
70. This was prepared by two Princeton University economists, Roy Fain and
Dwight Jaffee, pursuant to HUD contract H1781, April 1972. Treasury Recommenda-
tions, supra note 3, at 30, 41.
71. Id.
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a tax advantage, not given to commercial banks, that allows them to
make tax deductible contributions to bad debt reserves. Such con-
tributions consistently exceed actual default experience. 2 The pro-
posals will replace that incentive with a general tax credit, which will
be available to all financial institutions, for interest earned on resi-
dential mortgage loans. 73 The Administration expects that the cur-
rent tax subsidy, amounting to $545 million, in the form of tax-free
contributions to bad debt reserves, will be replaced by a tax credit
of at least the same amount. This will mean, therefore, that thrifts
will receive a lower overall subsidy, since a share of the subsidy will
be enjoyed by commercial banks.74 As a consequence, the incentives
for thrifts to serve the home mortgage market will diminish and, at
the same time, the incentives for commercial banks to switch from
corporate and commercial loans to housing may be insufficient to
make up the difference. Thrifts will be permitted, for instance, to
invest in consumer loans and bonds; the net result might well be a
substantial outflow of funds from the home mortgage market.7 5 Com-
mercial banks are unlikely to make up any such deficit, let alone add
to their current total commitments."0 If home mortgage investment
has such a high social priority, the Administration's voluntary tax in-
centive program may be seen more to jeopardize than vindicate that
policy.
In this context, the Patman proposals offer a viable, but not costless,
alternative. The Patman proposals require all financial institutions
to invest annually in home mortgages to the extent of their overall
asset growth for the year. While this approach compromises the free
market concepts supported by the Administration, it may ensure com-
pliance with the desired social goals expressed by Congress over the
last 40 years. For example, if the Patman proposals had been law, there
would have been an additional $15.6 billion for the home mortgage
market in the period from 1960 to 1970. 7 7 Moreover, the proposals do
72. Id. To obtain the maximum deduction, 82 percent of the thrifts' assets must
be eligible assets (residential mortgages); if less than 60 percent of the total assets
are eligible, the bad debt reserve deduction is not available. Id. at 27.
73. See p. 1355 supra.
74. See id.; Treasury Recommendations, supra note 3, at 29. This is the judgment
of several knowledgeable observers. See, e.g., Bus. WEEK, Nov. 3, 1973, at 83-84.
75. This conclusion is based on a potential $63 billion reduction of the $340
billion currently estimated to be invested in the home mortgage market. Credit Crunch
Hearings, supra note 8, at 461 (statement of Prof. Fairfax Leary).
76. However, it should be noted that real estate loans reveal lower operating costs
in large scale operations than do other types of commercial bank loan activity. See
note 89 infra. While this fact may play a role in the bank's decision to invest in
home mortgages, the long-term nature of the commitment may offset it.
77. STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 38.
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not ignore the goals of competition; in some respects they go further
than the Administration's de-regulation scheme.7 s On the other hand,
once a decision is made mandatorily to allocate funds for priority
purposes, inevitable questions of inefficiency and compromise with
other goals arise which could well generate other problems in the
future.7
9
Both proposals accept the desirability of a competitive banking
industry, and this raises a second inquiry not directly addressed in
either proposal. If in fact the underlying competitive model is un-
sound, or even dubious, the ultimate impact of these reforms may well
require greater government control. It seems advisable to consider
the validity of the competitive model as a major premise by evaluadng
the extent to which scale economies might ultimately frustrate the
goals of competition.
C. Competition, Economies of Scale, and Regulatory Policy
Federal savings and loan associations were created by a beneficent
Congress some 40 years ago to foster home ownership.80 Now to con-
vert these institutions into, in effect, commercial banks involves a
serious change in role.81 In terms of present priorities, this conversion
would seem justified only if competition would not frustrate those
social goals that led to the congressional support of thrifts. If, on the
other hand, the existence of scale economies suggests that free com-
petition is only a way station on the road to concentration, and if the
resulting large firms (which would presumably be the larger com-
mercial banks) would be less inclined to serve those social goals, regu-
lation would have to begin anew to achieve the goals currently, and
perhaps inefficiently, met under the existing system.
The literature on economies of scale in commercial banking is
78. The Patman proposals go beyond those of the Administration in that they would
allow payment of interest on demand deposits, a free market alternative rejected by
the Administration. See id. at 89-91; HUNT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 27-29;
Treasury Recommendations, supra note 3, at 6-8. See also Eisenbeis, The Hunt Com.
mission and Interest Payments on Demand Deposits, MAG. BANK AD., Jan. 1973, at
27. In addition the Patman proposals would allow thrifts to compete with commercial
banks for business loans. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 89. Business loans con-
stitute the largest lending categories for commercial banks. For example, the total
loans of commercial banks reported as of June 30, 1973, amounted to $426 billion.
Of that total $224 billion fell into the category of business loans. FED. Ras. BULL., Mar.
1974, at A22.
79. In this context, it should be noted that different ways of achieving the desired
fund flows, such as subsidies on the borrower side of the market, are worthy of
consideration.
80. See Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (1970); STAFF
REPORT, supra note 5, at 31.
81. Some thrifts have already been given powers inconsistent with their traditional
roles to stimulate deposit inflows. Treasury Recommendations, supra note 3, at 16-17.
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abundant 2 and often contradictory. While some suggest that scale
economies do exist,8 3 others contend that efficiencies of banking op-
eration are not largely a function of size.84 One of the most elaborate
studies on the subject (an examination of the banks in the Kansas
City Reserve District) concluded that average costs diminished until
an optimum bank size of $300 million in assets was reached s5 This
asset figure is about 12 times the asset size of the average bank in the
United States. 6 But as of December 31, 1972, 261 commercial banks,
95 savings & loans and 78 mutual savings banks exceeded $300 million
in assets.8 The average costs of banks of optimal size were figured to
be 30 percent lower than the costs of the then existing banks in the
Kansas City Reserve District.s Detailed studies have been completed
at the FDIC which conclude that scale economies are largely limited
to the operations of a single banking office (and the customers it
serves).8 These studies suggest that large single unit commercial
banks can compete effectively with branch banking institutions, but
they recognize that unrestricted branching can lead to excessive mar-
ket power in the hands of the branching bank. 90 Of course, the power
82. See, e.g., D. ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN BANKING (1954); L.
GRAMLEY, A STUDY OF SCALE ECONOMICS IN BANKING (1962); P. SMITH, ECONOMICS or
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS (1971). See also Bengston, The Optimal Banking
Structure: Theory and Evidence, 3 J. BANK RESEARCH 220 (1973).
83. See Wu & Connell, Merger Myopia: An Economic View of Supreme Court De-
cisions on Bank Mergers, 59 VA. L. REV. 860, 878-81 (1973). See also Bengston, Cost of Op-
erations and Economies of Scale in Savings and Loan Associations, in STUDY OF THE SAVINGS
AND LOAN INDUSTRY 677 (1. Friend ed. 1969).
84. Bengston, Economies of Scale and Marginal Costs in Banking Operations, 2
NAT'L BANKING REV. 507, 541 (1965).
85. Greenbaum, A Study of Bank Costs, 4 NAT'L BANKING REV. 415 (1967); Green-
baum, Competition and Efficiency in the Banking System-Empirical Research and
its Policy Implications, 75 J. POL. EcoN. 461 (1967). Mr. Greenbaum concludes that
reduction in the number of banks to 100 would produce cost savings of about $I billion.
Id. at 473-74.
86. See Greenbaum, A Study of Bank Costs, supra note 85, at 434; Wu & Connell,
supra note 83, at 879.
87. See Am. Banker, Feb. 13, 1973, at 105-10; Feb. 23, 1973, at 12-13; Jan. 31,
1973, at 12-13.
88. See Greenbaum, A Study of Bank Costs, supra note 85, at 434.
89. See W. Longbrake, Productive Efficiency in Commercial Banking: The Impact
of Bank Organizational Structure and Bank Size on the Cost of Demand Deposit
Services, FDIC Working Paper 72-10 (1972). The FDIC has, however, opposed bank
mergers in the courts by seeking to refute arguments asserting scale economies. See,
e.g., Brief for FDIC as Amicus Curiae at 17, United States v. First Nat'l Bancorpora-
tion, Inc., 410 U.S. 577 (1973). FDIC analysis of the operating costs of a nationwide
sampling of 972 banks revealed some economies of scale in certain commercial bank
services and no significant ones in others (demand deposits, time deposits, installment
loan functions, and safety deposit box services). Those services with scale economies
showed for a 10 percent increase in output the following increased costs: business
loans, 8.761 percent, securities and investments, 8.245 percent, and real estate loans
8.139 percent. Id. at 18.
90. See Gilbert & Longbrake, The Effects of Branching by Financial Institutions
on Competition, Productive Efficiency and Stability: An Examination of the Evidence,
4 J. BANK RESEARCH 154, 298, 304 (1973-74) (also published as FDIC Working Paper
74-1).
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to permit branching is normally held by state banking agencies which
themselves add another variable to regulatory policy.91 Indeed, recent
state laws are acting to discourage banking concentration by placing
a maximum deposit limitation upon bank and bank holding com-
panies operating in the state.92
Taken as a whole these studies suggest that banking is not free from
economic pressures which may lead to industry concentration. And
viewed as an original proposition, it would seem that economies of
scale should exist in banking. The major indicia of scale economies
(specialization of labor, indivisibilities, and risk reduction) are present
in the banking industry,9 3 and while some of these economies can be
realized at the unit level, as the FDIC studies suggest, others (such as
investment in computer equipment 94 and stabilization of lending
risks over a large number of accounts) would not appear to be ex-
hausted at that level.95 The risk factor with respect to total with-
91. State branching practices vary dramatically. The FRB has determined that 20
states permit statewide branching, 16 limited branching, and 15 permit only unit (single)
banks. The states in which banking is highly concentrated tend to be those with
statewide branching practices. See S. Talley, The Impact of Holding Company Ac-
quisitions on Aggregate Concentration in Banking, Mar. 1973, at 12, 21, 23 (FRB Pub-
hcation). In New York, statewide branching will be permitted after January 1, 1976,
N.Y. BANKING L,w § 105 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74), and savings banks are already
discussing the potential impact that increased competition will have on smaller banks.
See Albright Address, supra note 62, at 15-16. As a matter of federal banking policy,
state laws generally control the branching policies of national banks, although the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board has the power to establish branching guidelines for
federal associations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (1970); Allen, The Hunt Commission
Report, 29 Bus. LAw. 497, 515 (1974).
92. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 524.1802 (West Supp. 1974-75) (no bank holding com-
pany may control banks with more than 8 percent of the total state bank deposits);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 384-B:3 (1968) (holding companies limited to banks with 20
percent of state bank deposits); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-345 (West Supp. 1973-74)
(same). See also Am. Banker, Mar. 12, 1974, at I, col. I (discussing proposed Texas
constitutional amendment to limit holding companies to 8 percent of state's total deposits).
93. See Wu & Connell, supra note 83, at 878.
94. Economies of scale based on the provision of computer services are of three
basic types. First, as a general rule larger computer systems provide better per-
formance at a lesser price than smaller computer systems. Second, reliability and
availability are critical to a bank's computer system; if a bank's computer is "down"
for any significant length of time, the bank may be virtually unable to function. In
a very large facility there will typically be several computers of the same or similar
types. If one computer malfunctions, any critical applications that would ordinarily
be performed on it can be transferred to other computers. This is not possible in a
smaller installation. Third, it may be impractical for a banking unit in most com-
munities to utilize a computer if the unit is required to bear the entire cost of a
computer system. However, it will be practical to install a terminal in a branch bank
connected to the central computer facility of the bank. To some extent the foregoing
economies can be achieved by using a service bureau or time-sharing service; how-
ever, most banks will be reluctant to depend on computer equipment and software
not under their direct control to perform critical accounting and control functions.
Interviews with various bank data processing experts, Feb. 1974.
95. Some studies have shown average costs declining until banks reached $2 million
in assets and then remaining constant until $50 million is reached. D. ALHADEFF, supra
note 82, at 83. It may well be, however, that recent developments in computer tech-
nology have changed (and are changing) their calculations. See generally Schweiger &
McGee, Chicago Banking, 34 J. Bus. 203 (1961).
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drawals, for example, is greatly affected by the total number of ac-
counts, since as they increase, fluctuation in total deposits decreases.,,
The above analysis suggests serious challenges to the proposals for
regulatory reform. If, because of market characteristics, removal of
market restraints will encourage the tendency to concentration, the re-
sulting power of the dominant industry members could eliminate the
advantages of competitive pricing. Not only may the goal of obtaining
more home mortgage money not be achieved, but concentration could
well lead to an increase in the cost of other loans without correspond-
ing gains in deposit rates.
9 7
Of course, this conclusion ignores the presence of compensating
regulatory actions. As has already been mentioned,98 state banking
laws can act to reduce as well as increase the factors of concentration
in banking. On the whole, however, state regulation is too fragmented
and unpredictable to serve as a fulcrum for a unified banking concen-
tration policy. At the federal level, antitrust policy plays a substantial
role, and indications are that Congress and the Justice Department
are unwilling to accept lightly factors of additional concentration. 0
And in the area of bank acquisition of other nonbanking businesses,
the Bank Holding Company Act is designed to prevent' concentra-
tion.100 But these regulatory schemes may be inadequate to deal with
any tendency toward concentration resulting from proposals to allow
96. See P. SMITH, supra note 82, at 64-70.
97. There is evidence to suggest that increase in the bank concentration ratio
leads to increase in the interest rate on business loans. See Edwards, Concentration
in Banking and Its Effects on Business Loan Rates, 46 REv. ECON. STAT. 294-97 (1964);
Edwards, The Banking Competition Controversy, 3 NAT'L BANKING REV. 1 (1965). But
see Flechig, The Effect of Concentration on Bank Loan Rates, 20 J. FIN. 298 (1965).
98. See pp. 1362-63 supra. One other area in which states may affect bank regula-
tory policy is the enactment of usury laws which may act independently to limit
mortgage and other loan rates. Under the dual banking system there is little federal
policy can do other than urge the removal of those ceilings if they conflict with
interest rate ceilings or with the proposed removal of those ceilings. See Treasury
Recommendations, supra note 3, at 2.
99. Under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970), a merger which
would violate the antitrust laws (Clayton Act) can only be approved if its anticom.
petitive effects are "clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect
of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served." See id. § 1828(c)(5)(b); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S.
171 (1968); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967). See generally
Lifland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Bank Mergers, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
15 (1967).
100. See Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50,
1971-78 (1970). The FRB administers the Act. For a critical evaluation of the FRB's
performance, see STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 103-12. See also STAFF OF HOUSE COsthf.
ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 91sT CONG., lsT Sass., THE GROWTH OF UNREGISTERED BANK
HOLDING COIPANIES-PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Comm. Print 1969); Comment, Imple-
mentation of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970: The Scope of
Banking Activities, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1170 (1973). But see S. Talley, supra note 91, at
22-23 (despite holding company acquisitions, nationwide banking concentration has
declined by 2 percent from 1968 to 1973).
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banks and thrifts to compete freely.10' To some extent, antitrust pol-
icy in this field is limited by the countervailing tests of the Bank
Merger Act of 1966 and the Bank Holding Company Act.
102
Moreover, even if economies of scale do not dictate that bank fail-
ures will ultimately occur, the fear of increased competition may be
enough to trigger a rash of bank mergers. The characteristic thrift
institution reaction suggests that the threat of open competition may
cause them to seek a merger partner rather than try to compete in an
unregulated market.10 3 This could lead to a period of panic mergers
which, if they are approved by the appropriate banking agencies, the
Justice Department must review under the 30-day constraint of the
Bank Merger Act. 104 The increased Department workload might per-
mit any number of bank mergers to be consummated without appro-
priate judicial scrutiny. 103 It is possible, then, that the current pro-
posals could result in the further concentration of an already highly
concentrated banking industry, whether or not compelled by eco-
nomic efficiencies.
101. Antitrust policy under the Bank Merger and Holding Company Acts has so
far been thwarted by a judicial reluctance to apply the theory of potential com-
petition, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973). See United
States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd by
an equally divided Court, 410 U.S. 577 (1973). The Supreme Court currently has be-
fore it for decision two cases also rejecting the potential competition theory in banking.
United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1973), prob.
juris. noted, 94 S. Ct. 863 (1974); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., Trade
Cas. 94,496 (W.D. Vash. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 414 U.S. 907 (1974).
102. See note 99 supra. The Bank Holding Company Act contains the same test.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1970). Moreover, if economies of scale are shown to exist, the
failing company defense may become relevant to antitrust enforcement. See Citizen
Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See generally Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960).
103. Recently the New York Superintendent of Banks urged managements of thrift
institutions not to "throw . . . in the towel" and merge because of the "expected
onslaught" of statewide branching by outside banks which the new law may create in
New York. See Albright Address, supra note 62, at 15; note 91 supra.
The thrifts 'gave some indications of their fear of open competition when they
successfully urged Congress to place interest ceilings on wildcard certificates of de-
posit. See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 57-60 (statement of Savings &
Loan League Chairman, Legis. Comm., Tom B. Scott, Jr.).
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4) (1970).
105. Even without this additional enforcement burden there is evidence that the
Department has been unable to restrain the tendency to bank concentration. In 1966,
the 50 largest commercial banks held 44.4 percent of all commercial bank deposits;
today they control about half. Since 1966, the Justice Department has labelled com-
petitive effects of 106 proposed mergers "significantly adverse"; 76 of these mergers
were approved by the various banking agencies over this objection and Justice chal-
lenged 49 of those approvals. The 106 challenges by Justice resulted from its review
of 1,550 merger cases (a challenge rate of 6.8 percent). STAFF REP'ORT, supra note 5, at
114. See note 99 supra. For an assessment of the lack of uniformity among the policies
concerning merger approvals of the Justice Department, FDIC, and the Comptroller,
see Eisenbeis. Difference in Federal Regulatory Agencies' Merger Policies, FDIC Working
Paper No. 72-14 (1972).
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If, however, banking concentration is at least partially the result
of economies of scale, there may be little reason to discourage realiza-
tion of those economies. 1 6 But traditionally this society has engaged
in regulation of rates and entry, where the significant scale economies
distort the competitive market, to ensure that the benefits of the eco-
nomic efficiencies are passed on to the public. 0 7 This is not, however,
the focus of current regulation. The Administration and Patman pro-
posals both seek to eliminate regulatory supervision over the market-
place without analyzing the need for economic regulation in the event
that market concentration occurs.' 08 Since the empirical data on con-
centration building factors is not entirely clear, it may be that such
concerns are ultimately misplaced. And indeed other federal and
even state regulatory policies may be adequate to control any tendency
to concentration that does occur. But if in fact banking competition
is an idea worth exploring, and much evidence suggests that it is, then
it must be encouraged on the one hand and observed carefully on the
other. The role of the observer seems better suited to a regulatory
agency with unified power and precise direction.
II. The Separation of Commercial Bank Trust Departments
Effective competition between thrift institutions and commercial
banks must be predicated upon equality of opportunity in the market-
place. As has already been suggested, economies of scale may auto-
matically place smaller institutions at a competitive disadvantage.
While this may be an unavoidable condition, there is a more basic
inequality in the present market structure that is not beyond regula-
tory adjustment. Large commercial banks have in recent years estab-
lished trust departments which manage billions of dollars in pension,
foundation, and trust assets. Most thrift institutions do not have the
power to act as fiduciaries and the reform proposals have not recom-
106. See Wu & Connell, supra note 83, at 878-82.
107. See generally NV. JONEs, REGULATED INDUSMRIES (1967). See also Posner, Natural
Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548-91 (1969) (queries the extent to
which economic regulation is necessary to overcome the perceived market deficiencies
of natural monopolies).
108. Of course the argument could be made that, if concentration results in ex-
cessive market power in the hands of large banks, direct economic regulation could
be instituted at a later date. But failure to address the issue at this stage may ef-
fectively bury it forever. For example, since Congress has shown a reluctance to en-
gage in economic regulation of oligopolies, the banking industry may stabilize below
the monopoly level so as to avoid direct rate and entry regulation. See generally
Goodwin, The American Condition, THE NEw YORKER, Feb. 4, 1974, at 48.
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mended granting them this power. Moreover, given the degree of con-
centration in trust department operations (which far exceeds that de-
gree of concentration among commercial banks themselves),109 there
would be little opportunity for emerging thrift trust departments to
compete effectively in any event. This inequality suggests the more
direct regulatory solution of separating large trust departments from
their commercial bank parents.
A. Definition and Scope of the Problem
Sixty years ago Loiis Brandeis wrote a series of articles, collectively
entitled Other People's Money.110 The conclusions concerning the
market power of the investment bankers which he drew there shocked
many and led to some early reforms."' But these reforms did not dis-
sipate the "Money Trust" and Brandeis's conclusions are no less valid
now.
112
Today the market power of commercial banks like the First Na-
tional City Bank and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. must be meas-
ured not only by their $27.7 billion and $12.8 billion in deposits but
by the $17.1 billion and $26.7 billion investment portfolios managed
by their trust departments."' When aggregated this puts $40 billion
in assets under the control of one institution. And other large commer-
109. See notes 105 supra, 113 infra.
110. The articles appeared in Harper's Weekly during 1913 and 1914 and were later
published in book form. See Hapgood, Foreword to L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY at xxviii (1933).
111. The Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in various sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.), was enacted to separate commercial banking from investment
banking. But over the years the growth of pension funds (estimated to be $285 billion
by 1980) has led to a massive inflow of investable funds into bank trust departments.
Since the Act does not apply to bank trust departments (which were then not the
economic force they are today), it is an inadequate deterrent to market concentration
and control in banking. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 97. But cf. Investment
Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (investment trust fund declared
illegal under Glass-Steagall). And even in situations where the Glass-Steagall Act forced
severance of banking and investment activities, connections may still be present. Thus
it has been suggested that the Morgan Stanley investment banking house created as
a result of the Act is still closely connected to its former parent, the Morgan Guaranty
Bank, for whom the house performs underwriting and investment functions. See Tobias,
The Establishment Bank Faces Life, N.Y. MAC., Oct. 29, 1973, at 40.
112. To some extent Brandeis's concentration data are outmoded. When he spoke of
the "Money Trust" he referred principally to three New York banks; today those
banks (J.P. Morgan & Co., National City Bank, and First National Bank) are two.
L. BRANDEIS, supra note 110, at 19 (1933). Compare W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN
292, 440-47 (1974).
113. See Am. Banker, Feb. 13, 1973, at 105; FRB, Trust Assets of Insured Comm.
Banks-1972, at 70.
See also SENATE CoMM,. ON Gov'T OPEPRrIONS, 93D CONG., 1ST Sass., DISCLOSUREa Or
CORPORATE OWNERSmiP REPORT I (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
CORP. OWNERSIP REPORT]. The Report lists 28 institutional investors with assets over
$5 billion as of year end 1972. Of those 28, half are commercial bank trust departments.
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cial banks are of comparable size." 4 At the end of 1971, commercial
bank financial assets and trust department assets accounted for almost
60 percent of the total assets of all institutional investors.", Because
of director interlocks (especially with life insurance companies) these
banks also control indirectly even larger portfolios.116
The asset power of the commercial banks has a profound impact
upon the economy. One consequence is the creation of a two-tier mar-
ket in which stocks of larger companies trade at higher multiples of
earnings than do stocks of smaller coinpanies. 117 Since large trust de-
partments invest heavily in large companies," 8 the commercial side
has tended to complement those investments with loan policies that
necessarily restrict the availability of loans to smaller companies."10
This drives down the earnings multiples of those companies and seri-
ously impinges upon the ability of new companies to enter the market,
thereby ultimately having an impact upon the entire economy.
Moreover, this kind of investment concentration in larger com-
panies may lead to investment decisions and loan policies, with respect
to those companies, that are tainted by conflicts of interest. 20 For
example, 22 percent of the Penn Central Company's common stock
was held by bank trust departments; and these same banks through
director interlocks controlled much of the company's decisionmak-
114. Also in the $30 billion category are the following banks (trust assets in billions
listed first; deposits second): Bank of America ($6.5; $35.4); Chase Manhattan Bank
($16.2; $25.0); Bankers Trust Co. ($19.9; $10.6); American Banker, supra note 113; FRB,
supra note 113, at 70.
115. STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 93. This total was divided between commercial
banks' financial assets (37.4 percent) and trust assets (21.8 percent). The other large
institutional investors were life insurance companies (14.4 percent), savings and loans
banks (13.3 percent), and mutual savings banks (5.8 percent).
116. See p. 1369 infra.
117. See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 886-87 (statement of James Needham,
Chairman of N.Y. Stock Exchange); SENATE CORP.,OWNERSHtP REPORT, supra note 113, at 12.
118. The Morgan Guaranty Trust Company is said to have held, as of 1967, the
following percentages of the total outstanding common stock (most of it with voting
rights) of the following major companies: Xerox (9.7 percent), Polaroid (5.5 percent),
Burlington Industries (14.5 percent). Other large bank trust departments showed
similar degrees of control. STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 95. As of 1972, Morgan's
Xerox holdings were said to be down (to 5.0 percent), but its Polaroid holdings were
up (to 10.2 percent) and it held 4.5 percent of IBM common stock. Tobias, supra
note 111, at 41.
119. See SENATE CORP. OWNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 113, at 1-2. The Committee
on Publicly Held Companies (a group of 562 smaller corporations) has complained
that its members are frequently closed out of the credit market because of bank
trust department concentration "on a few religion stocks." Credit Crunch Hearings,
supra note 8, at 985, 986. But see U.S. Treas. Dep't, Public Policy for American
Capital Markets, reprinted in BNA 1974 SEc. REG. L. REP. No. 239, at D-I (Feb. 13, 1974).
120. Conflicts of interest have also been shown to exist in the savings and loan
industry where close relationships with real estate, insurance and construction activities
(often through director interlocks) lead to loan policies that restrict competition. See
Herman, Conflict of Interest in the Savings and Loan Industry, STUDY OF THE SAvINGS
AND LOAN INDUSTRY 44, 763-69 (I. Friend ed. 1969).
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ing.12 ' When the company's bankruptcy was in the offing, directors
of the Penn Central who were also directors of banks had to decide
whether to make further loans or stock purchases, or conversely to
sell out the trust department's investment prior to public disclosure.
122
In both situations the potential for conflicts of interest was plain.
123
It is also undoubtedly true that the voting power of bank trust
departments has a major impact on corporate policy; but so far that
impact has not been measured accurately. Bank trust departments
maintain significant holdings in nominee accounts, 24 a practice which
effectively disguises their true voting power. 125 Nevertheless, the
known voting rights of some bank trust departments are substantial
enough to provide effective control over many major corporations. 26
There is also evidence to suggest that major commercial banks are,
through trust departments, heavy investors in each other.'
27
Large bank trust departments pose serious challenges to the effective
regulation of the banking industry under current law. If de-regulation
becomes a desired goal, the bank trust department problem becomes
much more pronounced, especially for its influence upon the ability
of thrifts to compete. But the Administration's legislative proposals
have not confronted this necessary connection between industry de-
regulation and bank trust department separation.
121. Of the Penn Central's 23 directors, 16 were directors of 19 banking institutions.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 95.
122. Id.
123. A recent congressional study of 49 banks in 10 major cities revealed some
8,000 interlocking directors associated with more than 6,500 companies. More than
750 of the interlocks were with companies in the top 500 industrial companies. Id. at 97.
124. A nominee is "a person (or persons) designated to represent or take the place
in name only of another person, bank, company, or corporation." G. FISCHER, AmERICAN
BANKING S'ucruRE 88 (1968).
125. A recent congressional study under the direction of Senator Lee Metcalfe re-
vealed that bank trust departments utilize nominees more than any other institutional
investor. The use of nominees is especially prevalent in public utility reports. For
example, the Long Island Lighting Company listed in a report to the Federal Power
Commission its ten top shareholders, five of which were nominees with the same
New York City Post Office address at Church Street Station. Two of those nominees
turned out to be Chase Manhattan and three Morgan Guaranty. See SENATE CORP.
OWNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 113, at 9-10.
126. If 10 percent is taken as the benchmark of control, available data show
several banks with control of major corporations. For example, FCC data show Chase
Manhattan Bank to hold voting rights to 14 percent of CBS and Bankers Trust to
have voting rights to more than 10 percent of ABC. Id. at 8. See note 118 supra. See
also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d), 14(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1970)
(reducing control for ownership reporting purposes from 10 percent to 5 percent).
127. The data are difficult to obtain. There is no mandatory reporting requirement
under federal banking law, and Senator Metcalfe's request for top stockholders of
large commercial banks met with limited responses (24 of the 50 largest banks refused
to provide any information). Some did reply in at least limited fashion. The Chase
Manhattan and Morgan Guaranty banks, for example, revealed that nominees held
much of their stock, and Morgan acknowledged that among its 30 largest stockholders
were 17 nominees of 10 commercial banks. See SENATE CORP. OWNERSHIP REPORT, supra
note 113, at 9-10.
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B. Critique of Proposals for Bank Trust Department Reform
There is no shortage of proposals for bank trust department reform.
Most, however, propose solutions short of absolute separation from
commercial banks. The most popular solution, described by a meta-
phor, is building a "wall" between the two banking functions within
the commercial bank.1 28 To construct this wall so as to avoid the po-
tential for conflicts of interest and self-dealing, recommendations have
been made for improving the bank examination process and the collec-
tion of data about bank securities and portfolio management poli-
cies. 129 The Hunt Commission Report echoes this theme by recom-
mending that bank examining agencies investigate and monitor the
performance of bank trust departments. 30 Although the Administra-
tion's reform proposals largely rely upon the Hunt Commission for
inspiration, they are silent on the question of bank trust department
regulation.
The Patman proposals, on the other hand, directly attack the bank
trust department problem by requiring the complete separation from
commercial banks of all trust departments with trust assets in excess
of $200 million.131 The effect of this proposal, if implemented, would
be to divest from their commercial bank parents some 250 trust de-
partments (which control 89 percent of all trust assets) and leave in-
tact the remaining 3,374 bank trust departments. 132 This solution,
labeled radical by American Bankers Association spokesmen, 33 has
128. See Herman & Safanda, Commercial Bank Trust Departments and the "Wall,"
14 B.C. IND. & Co. L. REv. 21 (1972).
129. See Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities, 82
YALE L.J. 977 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lybecker, Regulation]; Lybecker, Regulation
of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities: Seven Gaps, Eight Remedies (Part
II), 91 BANKING L.J. 6 (1974). Lybecker has worked out in great detail proposals for
improved policing of trust department performance.
130. HUNT CoM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 101-06. For example, the Commission
recommended that bank trust officers be subject to a "prudent man rule" for in-
vestments in pension funds, as they now are for personal trust funds, and that they
be prohibited from using inside information received from the commercial side. The
Commission opposed the absolute separation of trust departments for fear that it
would result in a loss of trust services in many smaller areas due to inherent
economies of scale in the investment of funds. Id. at 104. To implement its pro-
posals, the Commission recommended that thrift institutions be given the additional
power to operate trust departments. The Financial Institutions Act, however, has not
incorporated this additional power in its reform proposals.
131. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 98-101. This $200 million limit parallels
the Hunt Commission's limit for the point at which trust departments should be
denied access to commercial banking department credit information. HUNT COMMt'N
REPORT, supra note 4, at 101. The Patman proposals prohibit use of commercial bank
information by the smaller trust departments as well. STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 100.
132. STAFF REPORT 100. The proposals also outline the rudiments of a new regula-
tory body, the Federal Trust Management Commission, whose function it would be
to supervise the management of all trust, pension, and foundation funds. See id. at 102.
133. See Am. Bankers Ass'n, supra note 54, at 25-27.
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triggered widespread industry concern.13 4 While it is a bolder pro-
posal than others, 3 5 it is the only reform measure that relates directly
to the other proposals for de-regulation.
The industry's ostensible objection to separation as a reform meas-
ure is that trust departments cannot exist on their own.' 36 But reliable
data seem to demonstrate that the unprofitability argument is based
on incomplete bookkeeping that fails to allocate to the trust depart-
ment large amounts of noninterest bearing demand deposits on the
commercial side.' 37 If that allocation is made, there is evidence that
the overall venture is profitable for banks. It has been estimated, for
example, that the value of those deposits to the bank adds (indirectly)
30 percent to bank trust department compensation. 38
If trust departments truly are unprofitable, it is difficult to under-
stand why banks fight to retain them. Since the present fee struc-
ture plus indirect demand deposit income are unable to support the
operations of trust departments (especially small ones), 39 one might
doubt whether commercial bank customers should be subsidizing
trust account customers. This kind of internal subsidization favors
a class of beneficiaries not generally deemed in need of protection.
Certainly the argument against separation is not strengthened by such
considerations. Once trust departments are made independent they
can seek upward revision in fee structure from the appropriate regu-
134. One recent response, from the American Bankers Association's Trust Division,
sought to rebut some of the charges against large trust departments by collecting
data on size of accounts, concentration, and diversification in bank trust departments.
See Am. Bankers Ass'n, Survey Report: Equity Trading and Investment by Trust De-
partments, 1974. It is difficult to understand why the kind of data this industry
survey seeks to provide were not available to regulators as a matter of course on a
more reliable basis; the survey was anonymous, unsworn, and incomplete (only 20.7
percent responded).
135. Ralph Nader, for one, has testified that a complete separation of trust de-
partments may not be necessary if trust department securities holdings are disclosed
and the bank is forbidden to have commercial banking relations with corporations
whose equity securities it holds. See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 472.
This solution, while formally eschewing separation, seems ultimately to create more regu-
latory problems than it solves.
136. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 100. See generally C. Golembe, The
Economic Power of Commercial Banks, 1970 (Am. Bankers Ass'n publication).
137. The SEC Institutional Investor Study showed that these demand deposit balances
in the 50 largest trust departments amounted to $1.5 billion at the end of 1969.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 100. Trust departments generate these deposits during
the period between purchase of securities and payment for them, between the sale
of securities and reinvestment, and between the receipt of dividends and investment
income and their disbursement. See HUNT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 105. This
activity may generate conflicts of interest when the bank is losing demand deposit
income to investments in short-term commercial paper and Treasury Bills. One way
to reduce the impact of this problem, by paying interest on demand deposits, has
not been adopted in the Administration's legislative proposals. See note 39 supra.
138. SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
139. See note 147 infra on brokerage fees and investment advisor information.
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latory agencies.' 40 It may be that economies of scale will dictate a
concentration of these independent trust departments with other in-
vestment advisers, but in that event the resulting entity will not con-
tribute to concentration in the commercial banking industry.141
The separation solution assumes that building a "wall" of silence
and nondisclosure between the trust and commercial banking depart-
ments is an inadequate alternative. There are serious reasons to doubt
that the wall will be high enough to sever interchange between one
side of the bank and the other. A bank's directors by definition sit
astride this wall and invariably learn what both departments are do-
ing.142 Moreover, trust department disclosure requirements frequently
compel public disclosure of the largest blocks of voting stock.' 43 Given
these limitations, attempts to build effective internal walls are unlikely
to succeed. In addition, no matter how impregnable the wall may ap-
pear to be, leaks will inevitably occur.14 4 For example, the exchange
of inside information can occur even though the wall itself is intact,
because of the bank's multiple relationships. Where the bank is both
a major shareholder and a major creditor of a listed company, infor-
mation may flow directly to the trust department from company man-
agement, who are concerned about protecting good relations with all
departments of the bank.
4
5
It is unrealistic to think that all of these practices will be overcome
merely by separating bank trust departments as the Patman proposals
recommend. Certainly, in the short run at least, many of the new en-
tities, after separation from the parent body, will retain essentially the
same stockholders, which may themselves be major commercial
banks.' 46 But most of the major problems of bank trust department
behavior stem from affiliation with a commercial bank. 47 The market
140. The fee structure is often set by state laws. See Lybecker, Regulation, supra
note 129, at 1001-02.
141. See p. 1367 supra.
142. See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 472-73 (statement of Ralph Nader).
143. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 99-100. The existing disclosure requirements
will be greatly augmented if some recently proposed regulations of the Comptroller of
the Currency are adopted. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1974, at 39, col. 7.
144. An often cited example of this problem is the Penn Central failure, where
some trust departments allegedly had advance word from bank loan officers on when
to sell out. See pp. 1368-69 supra. See also Schotland, Conflicts of Interest and Bank
Trust Departments-A Provocateur's Perspectives, Oct. 1973, at 10.
145. On this and other matters discussed in this section, the author benefited
from discussions with Professor Roy Schotland of the Georgetown University Law
Center and from Schotland, supra note 144.
146. One of the difficulties in measuring the potential impact of continued com-
mercial bank representation on the diverted entity is the difficulty in obtaining
knowledge about commercial bank shareholders. See note 127 supra.
147. Bank trust department operations also threaten competition in the provision
of investment services. The market for investment advisory services is dominated by
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power of the resulting combination is so great and the conflicts of
interest so endemic that building an effective wall is virtually im-
possible. And the irony is that if a true wall is achieved, the result
would in practical effect eliminate the distinction between the sep-
arated and unseparated (but walled) entities. Ultimately, therefore,
the arguments in favor of a true wall blend into those for separation. 148
Since there is little evidence that bank affiliation by itself pro-
duces superior trust department performance, 149 and since separation
will obviate the need for close regulatory supervision implicit in the
wall concept, there seems little reason to resist separation. Moreover,
the kind of regulatory intervention necessary to ensure the mainte-
nance of a true wall is inconsistent with the free market philosophy
of the Administration's proposals. The only defense of the present
structure is that offered by the Hunt Commission, which concluded
that if 'separation occurred, economies of scale would deprive smaller
communities of needed trust services.' 50 It would seem that the $200
million asset limitation on separation contained in the Patman pro-
posals would protect against that possibility and allow smaller com-
munities to retain trust department services within their local banks.''
In balance then the creation of separate trust departments should be
a welcome addition to the Administration's proposals for returning
competition to the banking field. Certainly the ability of thrift insti-
tutions to compete in this reordered market would be enhanced if they
had to face commercial banks alone and not commercial banks but-
tressed by the market power of trust departments.
bank trust departments, which are larger than all other institutional investors com-
bined. See Lybecker, Regulation, supra note 129, at 977. Large trust departments are
able to negotiate lower commissions with brokerage houses on block purchases and
sales and obtain extensive investment information services. See Credit Crunch Hearings,
supra note 8, at 887 (statement of N.Y. Stock Exchange President James Needham).
There is also some reason to believe -that these large trust departments are able to
encourage reciprocal deposits from brokerage houses as a condition to execution of trust
account orders. See HUNT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 104; STAFF REPORT, supra
note 5, at 99.
148. Governor Jeffrey M. Bucher of the FRB has recently recommended that bank
trust departments affiliated with commercial banks belonging to the same holding
company be consolidated into a separate subsidiary corporation within the holding
company. Governor Bucher believes that this kind of separation is essential because,
"as a matter of public perception, regardless of what is believed by trust men, the
Chinese Wall lacks sufficient strength to resist the abuses of economic power and
conflict of interest." Address by J. Bucher, Conference of Western Section of ABA Trust
Div., Sept. 21, 1973, at 15-17. While holding company separation is a middle ground
between wall building and complete spin-off, it would seem to achieve the same
goals as spin-off, at least until the market changes the stockholders.
149. Bank trust departments are not free of charges of trust mismanagement. See
STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 101-02.
150. HUNT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 104-05.
151. See p. 1370 supra.
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III. Reform of the Institutions of Reform
Banking law reform may be seen as both private and public, and
realignment of the members of the industry is in some respects no
more important than reorganization of the relevant regulatory agen-
cies. If, as frequently claimed, the industry's performance is restrained
by a residue of laws emanating from the Depression psychosis,152 so
too is effective regulation hindered by agencies with overlapping
jurisdictions. While banking laws were passed in periods of national
financial crisis without any well-conceived master plan, the current
proposals for private industry reform are offered as studied, noncrisis
alternatives to existing regulation. 5 3 A reevaluation of proposals for
public agency reform in order to produce a unified institutional ap-
proach to implement the goals of reform is thus timely as well.
A. The Present Regulatory Structure
Regulation of banking is a subject as old as the republic itself.
54
Initially, the issue of regulation was entangled in disputes over fed-
eral and state power, and the early Congress was reluctant to charter
banks without state approval.' 5 The result was that by and large the
banking field was left to regulation by the states.15 It was not until
the Civil War that federal regulation asserted itself and created what
came to be known as the "dual banking system."'
7
152. See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 473 (statement of Ralph Nader).
153. This is a conclusion that can be drawn both from the President's Message
to Congress of August 2, 1973, proposing the reforms, and the Hunt Commission
Report which suggested them. See HUNT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 7-9;
Treasury Recommendations, supra note 3, at 1-3. Other countries have experienced
similar crisis pressures on banking regulation that have in some cases led to highly
concentrated markets. See generally D. ALHADEFF, COMPETITION AND CONTROLS IN BANKING
(1968) (England, France and Italy).
154. In fact what is said to be the first genuine bank in the colonies predated
the formation of the Republic. Called the Bank of North America, it was formed
in 1781 under a resolution by the Continental Congress. The First and Second Banks
of the United States were set up by congressional enactments in 1791 and 1816. Act
of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, § 7(XV), 1 Stat. 191; Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, § l1(XIV),
3 Stat. 266. See W. HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-
1970, at 134-51 (1973).
155. The Bank of North America had apparently been chartered originally by the
Continental Congress but, because of doubt as to that body's power to act, the Bank
also obtained a charter from the Pennsylvania legislature. In 1784, the Bank of
Massachusetts and the Bank of New York followed the same procedure. G. FIsCrR,
supra note 124, at 9.
156. With the exception of the Bank of North America and the First and Second
Banks of the United States, all banks prior to 1863 were state chartered. G. FISCHER,
supra note 124, at 15. By 1863, there were 1,466 state banks. See BOARD OF GOvERNORS
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, BANKING STUDIES 418 (1941).
157. The discussion of regulatory reform will be limited herein to reform at the
federal level since that is the context of the current reform proposals. This does
not mean, however, that the issues raised by the dual banking system are also not
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The federal government enacted the first significant bank regula-
tion in 1863, when the National Bank Act was passed in order to cre-
ate a new currency to finance the war effort.15s The National Bank
Act established in the office of the Comptroller of the Currency the
first of the federal regulatory bodies that presently assert control over
banking. The Comptroller was authorized to regulate the national cur-
rency and to approve the establishment of national banks.159
The Federal Reserve Act of 191316° created the next significant
regulatory agency, the FRB. To overcome concern about rapid expan-
sion of credit, the Act required national banks to become members
of the Federal Reserve System and directed the Board to establish
more effective supervision of banking.' The Act also extended for
the first time federal supervision to state banks which, on a voluntary
basis, were allowed to become members of the system. 16 2 The Comp-
troller of the Currency, while still considered to be in charge of the
national banking system, was made an ex officio member of the
FRB.10
3
A third regulatory body, the FDIC, was established by the Banking
Act of 1933.164 This Act required the federal government to insure
deposits in all national banks and state banks which had become
members of the Federal Reserve System: it also permitted state banks
which were not members of the system to obtain insurance. 6 5 Today
all but a few of the 14,000 commercial banks in the United States
are insured by the FDIC.166 Over the years, the FDIC acquired ex-
important. Certainly, branch banking regulation and usury laws reveal that there are
significant regulatory problems posed by the dual sovereignty concept.
While this dual system still exists today, many feel that state authority could be
effectively overridden if the Congress ever decided to impose mandatory reserve
requirements on state banks. See Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 424 (re-
marks of Rep. Stephens). And recently the FRB has submitted to Congress proposed
legislation extending reserve requirements to nonmember institutions (commercial banks,
mutual savings banks and S.Ls) that issue demand or other types of deposits and
perform a checking account function. See Letter with enclosures from Arthur S. Burns
to Wright Patman, Jan. 25, 1974.
158. See G. FISCHER, supra note 124, at 18-19. See also B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND
POLITICS IN AMERICA, FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CtVIL WAR (1957); Hackley, Our
Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. Rav. 565, 570-73 (1966).
159. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 1, 12 Stat. 665.
160. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 2, 38 Stat. 251.
161. See Hackley, supra note 158, at 574-75.
162. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 9, 38 Stat. 259.
163. The FRB was empowered "to instruct the comptroller upon all necessary
matters .... " H.R. REP. No. 69, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 43-44 (1913). See Hackley, supra
note 158, at 575. The Comptroller no longer sits as a member of the FRB.
164. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. See Act of Sept. 21, 1950, ch. 967,
64 Stat. 873, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1970).
165. Nonmember state banks were actually extended insurance privileges in a series
of subsequent amendments. See Hackley, supra note 158, at 577-78.
166. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 55.
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panded powers over nonmember state banks, including control over
the payment of interest on deposits, the establishment of branches,
and bank mergers. 6
7
These three agencies are the ones principally concerned with the
regulation of banks.'68 Their jurisdictions have understandably be-
come thoroughly entangled. The Comptroller, the FRB, and the FDIC
share jurisdiction over national banks; the FRB and the FDIC share
jurisdiction over state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System; and the FDIC regulates insured nonmember banks. In addi-
tion, the FRB regulates bank holding companies for all types of banks,
even the small residual category of state, nonmember, noninsured
banks. 6 Congress has done little to reconcile these jurisdictions; 170
instead it has left intact what has been described as a confusing, in-
efficient, and inequitable pattern of regulation.171
A good example of this current pattern is the regulatory scheme
established by the Bank Merger Act.172 Under this Act, initial juris-
diction over mergers is divided among the three banking agencies
according to the nature of the resulting merged bank.'7 3 In addition,
each banking agency, as well as the Department of Justice, is required
to prepare advisory opinions on each proposed merger for submission
to the agency with primary responsibility. 74 Aside from the seeming
167. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c), (d), (g) (1970).
168. The activities of two other federal agencies, the Department of Justice and
the SEC, also have an impact upon banking. Justice applies the antitrust laws to bank
holding company acquisitions and bank mergers under the Holding Company Act
and the Bank Merger Act. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50, 1971-78 (1970); id. § 1828 (1970).
The disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are applied to
banks with widely held stock and trust investment accounts. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970);
Hackley, supra note 158, at 579-80, 786-92.
169. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50, 1971-78 (1970). See generally Comment, supra note 100.
170. One exception to congressional diffusion of regulatory authority has been
the granting of exclusive jurisdiction over regulated bank holding companies to the
FRB in 1956. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, as amended,
Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236, as amended, Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760. But even here there
have been unsuccessful legislative attempts to divide jurisdiction among the three
banking agencies. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 56.
171. See Hackley, supra note 158, at 799-814 (the author is General Counsel of the
FRB); Address by Governor J.L. Robertson of the Federal Reserve Board, BANMING,
June 1962, at 41.
172. Act of May 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129, as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828 (1970). See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); G.
FISCHER, supra note 124, at 122-74, 276-310.
173. The appropriate agencies are the Comptroller of the Currency if the surviving
bank is a national bank, the FRB if the survivor is a state-chartered, member bank,
and the FDIC if the survivor is a state-chartered, nonmember bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)
(1970).
174. The Bank Merger Act of 1966 provides that mergers which would otherwise
violate the antitrust laws are legal if their anticompetitive effects are "clearly out-
weighed" by the probable effect of the merger in meeting the "convenience and
needs of the community." Id. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1970). See generally Lifland, The Supreme
Court, Congress, and Bank Mergers, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 15, 28-32 (1967).
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inefficiency of four agencies commenting upon the same transaction,
the disparate views of these agencies in interpreting the same legisla-
tion has led to confusion and forum shopping. A comparison of ad-
visory opinions shows, for example, that the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency more often favors mergers than do the other three agencies.1
75
As a result, merger partners seek to place themselves in a position to
be reviewed by the Comptroller, and the Justice Department becomes
a watchdog "fourth banking agency" forced to attack these approved
mergers, and fight the other agencies, in court.'176 This difference in
views among the banking agencies necessarily has the effect of frus-
trating basic policy objectives. And the regulating that occurs is char-
acterized more by jurisdictional jealousies than by informed decision-
making.
77
B. Critique of Proposals for Institutional Reform
Given these institutional squabbles, 178 it is not surprising that both
industry and regulators have favored institutional reform for many
years. 79 What is surprising is the inattention which institutional re-
175. A study of bank merger advisory opinions from 1960 to 1969 revealed the
following approval rates (based upon dollar value of the merger assets): The FRB
found adverse competitive effects in 67 percent of the cases under its jurisdiction,
while the figure for the Justice Department was 59 percent. The FDIC, however,
disapproving 53 percent of its cases, was more lenient than Justice, which disapproved
67 percent of the same cases. The Office of the Comptroller was even more lenient;
it disapproved only 35 percent of its cases, whereas Justice disapproved 75 percent.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 59.
176. For a defense of the Comptroller's decisions on economic grounds and an at-
tack on the Justice Department's interference with the banking agencies, see Wu &
Connell, supra note 83, at 870-82.
177. As Governor J.L. Robertson of the FRB observed about the entire regulatory
system:
I am convinced that the people of this country will not-and should not-be satis-
fied with a system that by its very structure almost invites pettiness and bickering,
in which one group of banks can be played against the other, and where, in the
name of equity and fairness, bank supervisory standards are increasingly reduced
to the level of the lowest or most lenient.
BANKING, June 1962, at 41.
178. Id. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
179. Shortly after Congress established the FDIC, a Brookings Institution study of
government financial agencies proposed institutional reforms. See S. REP. No. 1275,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 222-23 (1937). For a detailed discussion of this and other reform
proposals, see Hackley, supra note 158, at 799-808.
An Advisory Committee on Banking, which contained several prominent bankers,
recommended in 1962 that the supervisory functions of the federal agencies be di-
vided among the FDIC and the Comptroller, eliminating the FRB's role in this area.
See ADVISORY COMM. ON BANKING TO THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NATIONAL
BANKS AND THE FUTURE (1962). A more dramatic proposal was that of Governor Robertson
of the FRB; he proposed the abolition of the FDIC and the Comptroller and would
place the FRBs supervisory functions in the hands of a single Federal Banking Com-
mission. See Hackley, supra note 158, at 805-08. That proposal appears to form the
underpinning for the current Patman proposals.
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form has received in the Administration's legislative proposals.8 0 The
Financial Institutions Act is silent on the subject, and the Hunt Com-
mission offered little in the way of basic changes.' 8 '
The Patman proposals, on the other hand, are quite specific in de-
scribing recommended reforms. They recommend establishment of a
single regulator, the Federal Banking Commission.'8 2 The agency is
to inherit all of the supervisory and examining functions of the three
federal agencies. The Comptroller of the Currency would cease to
exist and the FDIC would still receive and collect deposit insurance
but would be under the control of the new Commission.'8 3
The Holding Company Act and Truth in Lending Act responsi-
bilities of the FRB would be transferred to the new Commission but
the FRB's monetary policy functions would in no way be affected.8
4
The proposals also recommend the establishment of an Office of Pub-
lic Counsel to advocate public interest issues before the Commission
in proceedings over the approval of bank holding company acquisi-
tions and bank mergers. The Public Counsel would also have respon-
sibility for administration of the Truth in Lending Act, currently in
the hands of the FRB.
185
The idea of a single agency has strong opponents. Understandably,
the agencies themselves have an interest in their own existence, but
perhaps the most curious opposition comes from the Department of
Justice, which takes the position that jurisdictional competition
among agencies is an assurance of effective regulation. A spokesman
stated that "a single agency with responsibility for everything . . . will
frequently become highly protective of the firms that it is responsible
180. Consider, for instance, the Administration's tendency to recommend reorganiza-
tion elsewhere. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A
NEw REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (1971); FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATION STUDY TEAM, FEDERAL
ENERGY: AN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY (1974).
181. The Hunt Commission recommended agency name changes and some limited
changes in functions (the FRB's regulatory functions, minus Holding Company Act
responsibilities, were to be transferred to an Administrator of State Banks), but recom-
mended little to consolidate agency decisionmaking. See HUNT CO.MM'N REPORT, supra
note 4, at 87-95, 119-20; cf. Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Rccd
Hunt). Its recommendations have been criticized as perpetuating "the confusion and
conflict in federal bank regulations in a slightly different form." STAFF REPORT, supra
note 5, at 62. The Treasury Recommendations, supra note 3, and the Financial In-
stitutions Act, supra note 6, make no reference to those proposals.
182. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 62-65.
183. It should be noted that Chairman Patman earlier supported a reform pro.
posal that would have consolidated all federal bank regulation in the Treasury
Department. See H.R. 6885, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
184. See STAFF REPORT 62-65.
185. Id. at 62. The Commission would consist of five members appointed by the
President for five-year terms; one member must have had experience in state banking
supervision and another must have been a Governor of the FRB. Id. at 63.
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for and will tend to prevent any one of them from taking advantage
of its various efficiencies."18 6
This faith in agency competition seems misplaced given the current
squabbles in these agencies over appropriate regulatory standards,
especially with respect to bank mergers. 8 7 And while it is a cliche
of our time that a single agency can be coopted by those it regu-
lates,'88 there is no reason to believe that the present multiagency
arrangement is free from such pressures. Indeed, it is the opportunity
for forum shopping in the present structure that has led to the cur-
rent trend toward the least abrasive regulation. 8 9 The present multi-
agency concept, therefore, may offer not vigorous agency competition,
as the Department of Justice contends, but rather an opportunity for
those regulated to divide and conquer. A single agency is of course
not free from comparable pressures, but it would be more visible
and therefore subject to closer political and judicial supervision.
There is no reason automatically to accept the cynical conclusion that
there is an absolute correlation between the locus of government
power and the degree of cooptation by private interests. Moreover,
the single agency concept offers opportunities for achieving admin-
istrative efficiencies not currently available. Few doubt that a single
agency will achieve significant economies in reducing the present
agency structures by two.' 90
The single agency concept is vitally important to the proposals for
banking competition. One of the fears in connection with this new
competition is that thrift institutions and smaller banks will perceive
themselves to be at a competitive disadvantage with the large com-
mercial banks and rush into bank mergers or holding company affilia-
tions. In the present structure, these mergers may be achieved in many
cases by shopping for jurisdiction within one of the more permissive
agencies such as the Comptroller of the Currency.' 9' A single agency
186. Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 528 (statement of Donald Baker,
Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice). Accord, HUNT COMM'N
REPORT, at 60. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 24 (statement of William
E. Simon).
187. Even Justice balks at the presently divided agency responsibility over bank
mergers. Calling the system "perverse," it recommended consideration of a centralized
merger agency. Id. at 534.
188. The Justice Department cites as evidence of this possibility regulation of
transportation by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Credit Crunch Hearings, supra
note 8, at 528. See Stigler, Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. MGT. Sci. 3 (1971).
189. See note 177 supra.
190. Eliminating duplicative agency staff functions (e.g., three examining staffs) should
provide regulatory cost reductions. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 5, at 64-65.
191. The Justice Department may second-guess other agency decisions, but its su-
pervision is limited and somewhat haphazard. In the period 1960 to 1970, the Justice
Department brought only 70 cases. Credit Crunch Hearings, supra note 8, at 526-27.
See also notes 105 & 175 supra.
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with a clear understanding of its role would be able to supervise
mergers and affiliations and to implement regulatory policy in a
fashion beyond the capabilities of the truncated multiagency concept.
Furthermore, if the presence of significant economies of scale in
banking is confirmed, a single agency will be needed to measure the
need for industry consolidation and to monitor the industry to deter-
mine if rate and entry restrictions are or should be appropriate.
Conclusion
A series of recent proposals for reform of financial institutions, and
the prospect that the next Congress will carefully address these pro-
posals, indicates that this is an opportune time to consider fully all
aspects of reform. The Administration has already submitted a legis-
lative proposal, the Financial Institutions Act of 1973, which it bills
as a total package of reforms. In reality, however, it takes a rather
narrow approach to reform, in that it focuses principally upon one
solution-de-regulation of the marketplace-to meet several professed
social goals.
Certainly there is reason to believe that interest rate ceilings and
other constraints upon financial institution competition have created
inefficiencies inimical to the public interest. However, resort to com-
petition is justified not merely because it is efficient, but because it
is believed that competition among financial institutions for loanable
funds will reduce the disintermediation currently occurring in the
home mortgage market. It is doubtful whether competition alone will
achieve a more reliable infusion of funds into the home mortgage
market; in fact the tendency may be for many thrift institutions,
which are federally created specialists in home mortgage lending, to
emulate the lending policies of commercial banks, which have his-
torically minimized their home mortgage commitments. To be sure,
the Administration has proposed a tax credit to encourage home
mortgage investment, but that credit has been challenged as an insuf-
ficient inducement. The practical effect, then, of the Administration's
proposal may be to favor the market efficiency principle over a com-
mitment to home mortgage subsidization.
Further, the proposed competitive market solution must be ques-
tioned on the ground that the presence of economies of scale in bank-
ing may lead ultimately not to a competitive, but to a concentrated,
market. Enough empirical data show such a possibility to warrant
a careful evaluation of the competitive solution, especially as it is
presented in the Administration's legislative scheme. Thrifts do not
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generally have the market power of commercial banks, yet the Admin-
istration's proposal still restricts them from competing in certain
markets, such as business loans.
Moreover, the Administration's proposal fails to consider the effect
the additional market power provided by bank trust departments will
have upon the ability of thrift institutions to compete effectively with
commercial banks. Evidence suggests that the inevitable conflicts of
interest facing trust department management make commercial banks
a beneficiary of additional market power denied thrifts. Any solution
that seeks to create competition in banking must try to equalize com-
petitive opportunities; to do that requires a consideration of the sep-
aration of trust departments from their commercial bank parents.
Indications are that separation, rather than wall building, is the best
way to ensure effective banking competition.
The Patman proposals, which have not yet reached legislative form,
deal broadly with financial institution reform and seem to favor more
of both competition and regulation. There is more competition pro-
posed in that the proposals would open up the market by allowing
thrifts to make business loans, and both thrifts and commercial banks
to offer interest on demand deposits. Moreover, the proposals perhaps
implicitly acknowledge the relevance of bank trust departments to the
question of competition between commercial banks and thrifts by
arguing that banks should be separated from the trust departments.
On the other hand, the Patman proposals seek to retain, and even
expand, regulation of banking. A prominent suggestion is the protec-
tion of home mortgage loans by requiring a mandatory investment
in that market based upon an institution's annual asset growth. This
solution overcomes the potential inadequacies of the Administration's
tax credit proposal, although admittedly at the cost of direct inter-
vention into the marketplace. The proposals also recommend the
formation of a single banking agency with the regulatory powers of
the existing three banking agencies. Undoubtedly this new agency will
develop an expanded regulatory role, but the drastic changes in exist-
ing market structure suggest the appropriateness of expanded respon-
sibility. Without this agency, even sound substantive legislation may
founder in application because of existing jurisdictional entangle-
ments.
At this stage, the most complete reform proposals are presented in
the Patman package. If the Financial Institutions Act cannot be ex-
panded in scope to include consideration of those reforms, it imposes
great risk upon the banking market with potential for only limited
gains. Reform in the 94th Congress should demand more.
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